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Abstract We analyze the motivation of politicians in democracies when long-term policies
are socially desirable. Politicians receive utility from holding office and from the success of
their projects. We refer to the two extreme types of politicians as “populists” and “policy
success-seekers”. One result is that inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a
politician is of the populist type. When politicians offer incentive contracts, the problem of
inefficient decision-making may be solved. The amount of money necessary to induce the
incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of populism
he displays.
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1 Introduction
One important inefficiency in the political process is caused by the fact that democratic
elections alone cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term, socially beneficial projects
that do not perform well in the short run, when politicians are short-term oriented or future
elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies. In this paper we develop a
model framework to analyze this kind of inefficiency called the “down-up problem”. In this
instance, there is one policy project that is not efficient in the long run but leads to good
results in the short run. Another option is to undertake a long-term oriented policy project
that is less successful in the short run but leads to a socially efficient result in the long run.
The paper shows that under certain circumstances the incumbent might prefer to implement
the socially inefficient short-term-oriented policy to increase his reelection chances.
We consider two types of politicians differing with regard to their utility function. One type
of politician is mainly motivated by the benefits obtained from holding office. Hence, he will
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pursue a policy that gives him the best chances of being reelected. We will call this politician
a “populist”. The other type of politician has private benefits from the positive results of the
policy implemented. We will refer to this kind of politician as a “policy success-seeker”. We
assume that voters know the type of a politician and analyze how the motivation of politicians
is related to the inefficiency characterized above. Surprisingly, under the assumptions used
in this paper, inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a politician is a populist.
To solve the inefficiencies caused by the down-up problem we use a combination of demo-
cratic elections and the competition of politicians for incentive contracts. The theoretical
analysis of incentive elements in politics has been initiated by Gersbach (2003) and extended
by Gersbach and Liessem (2001, 2003), and Gersbach (2004a). A comprehensive summary
of the ideas, chances and problems of incentive contracts for politicians can be found in
Gersbach (2005). There is extensive literature on incentive contracts in general. The analysis
of incentive problems in the classical principal-agent framework started with Mirrless (1976),
Holmstro¨m (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983). One can distinguish incentive schemes
based on objective performance measurement (see e.g. Baker, 1992; Lazear, 2000) and in-
centive mechanisms based on subjective performance assessments (see e.g. Gibbons, 1998).
We use an objective performance measure in this paper, as we make payment dependent on
the results of the politician’s projects.
There are also some other branches of the literature relevant for this paper. First, there
is a growing range of literature on the optimal remuneration of politicians (see e.g. Besley,
2004; Messner & Polborn, 2004; Poutvaara & Takalo, 2003). Second, related to the topic of
remuneration is the discussion of term limits for politicians. An extensive overview of the
literature concerning term limits can be found in Smart and Sturm (2004).
Third, and directly relevant for our purposes, there is the literature on populistic politicians
(see e.g. Canovan, 1981; Gersbach, 2004b). Canovan (1981) criticizes the prevalent opinion
that populism is dangerous to democracy. She argues that popular decisions are essential for
democracy. Thus, populists might be considered as extremely democratic. We provide an
analytical result in this direction: Populism is not necessarily detrimental for society. This
is in contrast to the results in Gersbach (2004b), where populism may lead to undesirable
outcomes. In Gersbach (2004b), voters do not know the type of politicians and whether a
politician is competent or not. One result of Gersbach (2004b) is that populists try to mimic
the behavior of statesmen and want to appear as competent to improve their reelection chances
by being regarded as statesmen. As a consequence, policy decisions are distorted and thus
populism leads to undesirable outcomes. The focus of our paper is different: In the basic
version, there are no information asymmetries, but politicians lack incentives to undertake
long-term beneficial projects.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature about electoral accountability initiated by
Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) and extended by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997). In
this literature voters and politicians are assumed to have different sources of utility. An attempt
is made to solve the emerging principal-agent problem by an optimal election mechanism.
The pursuit of reelection is an incentive for self-interested politicians to act in accordance
with the interests of voters. However, even the optimal election mechanism is frequently
unable to guarantee socially efficient solutions.
Accordingly, we present in this paper a dual mechanism of elections and incentive contracts
as a more powerful control mechanism in politics. Although we add contractual accountability
to politicians, we are aware of the fact that the principles of democracy have to be adhered
to.
We use a similar model to that of Gersbach (2004a). Voters are assumed to be fully rational.
The elected politician has to implement one type of policy. His options are a socially efficient
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policy, a socially inefficient policy, and the status quo. The results are derived in two different
scenarios. In the commitment scenario, the voters are able to commit themselves to a reelec-
tion scheme depending on policy performance. This reelection scheme is announced before
the elected politician starts his first term. The second case is the more realistic framework of
non-commitment, where the public is not able to commit itself to such a reelection scheme.
In both scenarios the game is finished after the second period. This may be interpreted as a
two-period term limit for politicians. In our solution proposal, we permit politicians to offer
monetary incentive contracts during their campaigns, while there is also the familiar control
mechanism of periodic, free, and anonymous elections. The incentive contract connects the
remuneration of the incumbent to his political performance.
Our main results are as follows: First, in the commitment case the incumbent will undertake
the socially inefficient policy if he is mainly motivated by the positive results of the policy he
has implemented. Hence, inefficiencies are smaller if a politician is populistically inclined,
while policy success-seekers generate higher inefficiencies. Second, in the case of total non-
commitment the incumbent will not undertake the socially optimal project, except for the
case where he is a 100% populist. Finally, if politicians are permitted to offer incentive
contracts, then it will always be possible to motivate the incumbent to implement the socially
optimal policy. Thus, both in the case of a populist and in the case of a policy success-seeker,
it is possible to solve the down-up problem. However, the amount of money necessary to
induce the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of
populism he displays. Thus, it is advantageous for society if politicians are rather populistic.
We have organized the paper in the following way: In the next section we present our model
and the assumptions. We look at the efficiency of the election mechanism in Section 3. In
Section 4 we allow politicians to offer incentive contracts and observe that the dual mechanism
of elections and incentive contracts alleviates the inefficiency problem. In Section 5 we look
in detail at two extreme types of politician: statesmen and populists. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Model and assumptions
Our model is close to that of Gersbach (2004a). We consider a dynamic game with two
periods denoted by j = 1 and 2. Before the first period starts, two risk-neutral politicians,
indexed by i = 1 and 2, compete for office. In the first period, the elected candidate makes
a policy decision about undertaking a project. An implemented project generates returns
in both periods, denoted by V 1 and V 2, respectively. Later, the returns will be subscripted
according to the type of project. All politicians and all voters are assumed to be perfectly
informed. Thus, there are no problems of asymmetric information.
2.1 Sequence of actions
The complete game is given as follows:
Stage 1: The public decides which politician gets elected. We use pi to denote the prob-
ability that politician i will be elected. We assume that p1 + p2 = 1 and that
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1.
Stage 2: The incumbent has to make a decision about undertaking policy projects. There
are three possibilities: he can choose a short-term policy (STP), he can undertake
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a long-term policy (LTP), or he can continue with the status quo and do nothing
(NOT). We describe the policy projects in the next subsection.
Stage 3: The voters observe the returns from the first period. The incumbent decides
whether he wants to run for office again. The public decides on the reelection of
the politician, and incumbent i gets reelected with probability qi (0 ≤ qi ≤ 1).
2.2 Policy projects
The returns to the public from the options STP, LTP, and NOT in period j are denoted by V jS ,
V jL , and V
j
N , respectively. Note that we assume that policy results are perfectly observable to
the voters.1 The short-term policy STP generates a positive return V 1S > 0 in the first period,
but a negative return V 2S < 0 in the second period. The long-term policy LTP is assumed to
have no short-term consequences (i.e., V 1L = 0),2 but it generates positive payoffs V 2L > 0 in
the second period. If the politician continues with the status quo and thus chooses the option
NOT, the payoffs are V 1N = V 2N = 0, as the social returns from the status quo are normalized
to zero. Hence, the payoffs of LTP and STP indicate the differences to the status quo.
The total returns to the public from the options STP, LTP, and NOT are denoted by TV S ,
TV L , and TV N , respectively. Thus:
TV S = V 1S + δ V 2S
TV L = δ V 2L
TV N = V 1N + δ V 2N = 0
δ is the discount factor of the public (0 < δ ≤ 1). Furthermore, we assume that
V 1S > TV L
TV L > TV N > TV S
The last assumption immediately implies that the socially optimal policy is LTP. There
are many examples for the problem where a policy has only a poor (or even a negative)
performance in the short term but is socially optimal in the long run. For instance, labor
market reforms involving dismissals of employees can cause higher unemployment in the
short term while additional jobs only emerge gradually. Higher investments in education
may lead to higher taxes in the short run, while there is a positive effect on public welfare
in the long run caused by the growth in human capital. The transition of centrally planned
economies towards market economies may imply welfare deteriorations in the short term
as the existing structures of economy have to be dismantled. Nevertheless, the change of
the economic system may generate benefits in the long term. Note that before elections
1 We make this assumption as we wish to show that the election mechanism is not always able to motivate
the elected politician to undertake the socially efficient policy. If this is not possible in the case of perfectly
observable project results, then it will not be possible under any other scenario either. Note that incentive
contracts will still be efficient if voters cannot perfectly observe the policy results, although the costs of
incentive contracts might increase. Hence, one could extend the model to the case where there are errors in
observing project results without changing the conclusions of the paper.
2 The short-term consequences of LTP can sometimes even be negative, but this would only reinforce the
results of this paper.
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politicians often adopt short-term policies instead of long-term policies in order to achieve
quick successes and thus to ensure their reelection.3
We assume that contracts can be conditioned on political results measured by such things
as GDP growth, rate of unemployment, or criminal statistics.4 However, we also assume that
contracts cannot be conditioned on the policy choice itself, as this would require complete
contracts including all possible laws and policies, which seems to be impossible.5
2.3 Politicians’ utility
We assume that the politician is genuinely concerned about the social return he generates, as
long as the outcomes of policies occur while he is in office. The politician receives private
benefit if the implemented project generates a social return that is larger than the return of
the status quo as long as he is in office. The private benefit is given by α · max{V, 0},6 where
α is a number with the restriction 0 < α < 1. The parameter α measures the extent to which
the candidates receive private benefit from the social return generated by the implementation
of their policy.7
A second source of private utility is the benefits from holding office. These benefits are
denoted by B > 0 and can include monetary rewards as well as non-monetary benefits like
prestige or the satisfaction of being in power.8
The utility of outside options is assumed to be zero. That means that the costs and benefits
of a politician are normalized to zero if he is not in office. We assume that the politicians
and the public have the same discount factor δ. We use Ui to denote the expected utility of
politician i in period 1, when he campaigns for office for the first time, and assume that
Ui = pi {(1 − mi )B + mi αV 1 + δqi [(1 − mi )B + miα · max{0, V 2}]}. (1)
The parameter mi is the significance agent i assigns to private returns from projects,
while (1 − mi ) is the significance of benefits from holding office. The values m1 and m2
are exogenously given for both candidates at the beginning of the game. For the moment,
we assume 0 ≤ mi ≤ 1.9 A value of mi close to 1 means that the agent is mainly motivated
by the policy he implements. A low value of mi corresponds to a politician who is mainly
concerned with holding office. In other words, one could call a politician with high-valued mi
a “policy success-seeker”, while a politician with mi close to 0 will appear to be something
more like an “office-seeker” who is only concerned about being reelected and may thus be
3 There is a wide range of literature on such political business cycles (see, for example, Nordhaus, 1975;
Hibbs, 1977; Persson & Tabellini, 1993).
4 For simplicity of exposition, contracts are assumed to be linear in these figures. Since the results in the
second period can only take three values, this assumption could easily be relaxed.
5 Detailed information about incomplete contracts can be found, for example, in the survey by Hart (1995).
6 Note that max{V 1, 0} = V 1, since V 1 is assumed to be non-negative in all three possible projects.
7 Alternatively, the private benefit could arise from the fact that high returns enable the politician to pay some
returns to interest groups supporting him, as is suggested by a large range of literature on public choice (see
e.g. Mueller, 1989). This interpretation yields the same qualitative conclusions, but the voters must consider
that some returns from projects are lost for the public as they are removed by the politician to compensate the
interest groups supporting him.
8 We assume that the non-monetary benefits of B are converted into a monetary value so that we are able to
calculate with all utility components in one utility function.
9 Later we consider a higher minimum level for mi .
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called “populist”. We allow for the fact that politicians may differ in the factor mi (i = 1, 2).
The values mi are known to both politicians. Furthermore, we assume in the following that m1
and m2 are known to the public. It is often well-known whether a politician is more interested
in the results of his policy or in benefits from holding office, especially if the incumbents have
already had long political careers. Without any loss of generalization we label candidates in
such a way that m1 ≥ m2.10
We immediately get
 the utility of an elected politician i if he undertakes LTP and is reelected:
U Li (qi = 1) = (1 − mi )B + δ
{(1 − mi )B + miαV 2L
} (2)
 the utility of an elected politician i if he undertakes STP and is reelected:11
U Si (qi = 1) = (1 − mi )B + miαV 1S + δ(1 − mi )B (3)
 the utility of an elected politician i if he undertakes STP and is not reelected:
U Si (qi = 0) = (1 − mi )B + miαV 1S (4)
Note that U Si (qi = 1) ≥ U Si (qi = 0), as B > 0. Therefore, voters can always punish a
politician by not reelecting him. Furthermore, running for reelection is a weakly dominant
strategy for a politician irrespective of his project choice. Thus, we do not have to consider
the case where a politician does not want to run for reelection in our analysis.
2.4 Tie-breaking rules
To simplify the presentation, we use three tie-breaking rules.
 First, if two politicians are expected to generate the same total returns to the public, the
voters will elect the politician with the lower factor mi .12
 Second, if both politicians generate the same total returns to the public and are identical in
terms of the factor mi , both politicians will have the election probability p1 = p2 = 12 .
 Third, if two policies yield the same utility for the politician, he will select the policy that
yields higher social welfare.
These tie-breaking rules simplify our exposition but are not essential for the results.
10 Our main results can easily be extended to more than two politicians and to values of mi picked from a
continuous set. For instance, in the case of three or more politicians, only those two politicians with the lowest
values mi matter for the Propositions 3, 4, and 5 and the corresponding corollaries.
11 Note that the utility from private returns in the second period is 0, as max{V 2S , 0} = 0.
12 This rule perhaps sounds surprising as a “policy success-seeker” – corresponding to a high value of mi –
seems to be preferable to a populist. Nevertheless, as we will see later, the situation is the other way around.
The lower the value of mi , the easier it becomes to implement LTP.
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3 Results
By assumption, the optimal policy for the public is LTP. In this section we analyze how the
voters can induce the politician to undertake LTP. Voters have to make their election decision
before the politicians undertake the policy project. As we will see below, it will always be
optimal to elect the politician with the lower value mi . We will look at two different scenarios
concerning the voters’ ability to commit themselves to their reelection decision.
First, we assume that the voters can commit themselves at the beginning of the game
to their reelection scheme in stage 3 in order to give the election mechanism the largest
possible power to motivate the elected politician to undertake LTP. The voters announce two
reelection probabilities, depending on the results they observe. If the politician undertakes
STP, the public will observe V 1S and will reelect the politician with probability q(V 1S ). If the
politician undertakes LTP or NOT, the voters will observe a result of 0 and will reelect the
politician with probability q(0). Under these assumptions we obtain our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme in
stage 1. If mi > m˜(δ) with
m˜(δ) = δB
αV 1S + δB − δαV 2L
, (5)
then there is no reelection scheme of the voters that can motivate the elected politician to
undertake LTP.13
Proof: First, the politician will never choose NOT under any reelection scheme.14 He has
the same reelection probability under LTP and NOT, as the voters are not able to distinguish
between the two policy results after period 1. For q(0) = 0 and mi = 0, the benefits of the
incumbent under LTP are larger than his benefits under NOT. For q(0) = 0 or mi = 0, his
benefits are equal under LTP and NOT. In case of equal benefits under LTP and NOT, the
politician will choose LTP according to our third tie-breaking rule.
Second, the optimal reelection scheme for the public is setting q(0) = 1 and q(V 1S ) = 0,
which is the largest possible spread to deter the politician from choosing STP. Not reelecting
a politician who has implemented STP is optimal for the voters, as he has no negative
private utility from a negative result in period 2.15 Hence, the critical value m˜(δ) is calculated
by setting U Li (qi = 1) = U Si (qi = 0), which yields the above result for Equation (5). If
mi < m˜(δ), then U Li (qi = 1) > U Si (qi = 0). Thus, a politician will choose LTP under the
reelection scheme q(0) = 1 and q(V 1S ) = 0 if 0 < mi ≤ m˜(δ), and STP otherwise. 
This result seems quite surprising, as one might think that a politician who is mainly concerned
with holding office would be worse for the public than a politician who is interested in the
policies he implements. But surprisingly the reverse is true. A politician who has only a
low estimation of his project results Vi obtains better performance. The reason for this
13 Note that the term (αV 1S + δB − δαV 2L ) is strictly positive, as we have assumed that V 1S > TV L .
14 Note that this is only true since we assume that there are no effort costs for the incumbent. The result would
no longer be inevitably true in the case of effort costs. Then doing nothing could be advantageous for the
elected politician.
15 Note that it might be possible for the public to punish a politician by reelecting him if the incumbent had
negative private utility from a negative result in period 2.
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somewhat paradoxical result is the shape of the politicians’ utility function. LTP will only
be implemented if U Li (qi = 1) ≥ U Si (qi = 0). If the politician undertakes STP he will not
be reelected.16 Hence, he benefits from V 1S but suffers no damages from V 2S . By assumption,
we have V 1S > δ V 2L . The politician can only obtain higher utility from implementing LTP
if the effect of V 1S > δ V 2L is compensated by the benefits from holding office in the second
period. Hence, a low value of mi facilitates the implementation of LTP. As δB < (δB +
αV 1S − δαV 2L ) (and thus m˜ < 1), we immediately obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Assume the extreme case mi = 1. Then LTP can never be implemented, irre-
spective of the other parameters.
The case mi < m˜(δ) is not possible for mi = 1, irrespective of the values of α, B, δ, V 1S ,
V 2S and V 2L . This again shows that the larger the value of mi , the more difficult it becomes to
motivate the politician to undertake LTP. This fact can also be observed in our next corollary,
which follows directly from proposition 1 since m˜(δ) can never be negative.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme in stage
1 and that they use q(0) = 1 and q(V 1S ) = 0. If mi = 0, then LTP is always implemented,
irrespective of the other parameters.
Thus, a politician who is only interested in the benefits from holding office will always
undertake the optimal policy. In the following, we examine the connection of m˜ and δ. From
Equation (5) we obtain lim m˜(δ) = 0 for δ → 0 and
∂m˜(δ)
∂δ
= αV
1
S B
[
αV 1S + δB − αδV 2L
]2 > 0. (6)
So for δ → 0 the politician only chooses the efficient policy if mi → 0. This is not surprising
as δ close to 0 means that the politician has almost no valuation for the future. Thus, the
benefits from holding office in the second period, which are the only means of motivating
the incumbent to undertake LTP, are irrelevant. With growing δ the range for mi increases, at
which point politicians will choose the socially efficient policy. Note that voters are assumed
to be fully rational and infer negative future returns from the positive returns of short-term
projects in the first election period.
The public’s inability to motivate the elected politician to undertake LTP for some param-
eter constellations gets even worse when the voters cannot commit themselves to a reelection
scheme. This assumption of non-commitment is more realistic for democratic decision-
making. As an example of the severity of the problem in such cases, suppose that the public
votes prospectively so that past policy performance does not influence the reelection chances
at all.17 Imagine for example that q(0) = q(V 1S ) = 12 . This means that the ex ante reelec-
tion probability of the incumbent is 12 , independent of the policy undertaken. Under this
assumption we obtain:
16 Furthermore, we assumed that even in the case of being reelected the politician has no negative private
utility from a negative result in period 2.
17 This is an extreme assumption and made solely for expositional purposes.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that q(0) = q(V 1S ) = 12 and that mi = 0. Then the politician cannot
be motivated by elections to undertake LTP.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1. This time we have to compare
U Li (qi = 12 ) with U Si (qi = 12 ). This yields the following condition, which must be satisfied
to motivate the politician to undertake LTP:
δmi V 2L ≥ 2mi V 1S .
By assumption, this condition can not be fulfilled for mi = 0, which completes the proof.

The proposition illustrates that it is impossible to motivate a politician (except for the
case of a 100% office-seeker) to adopt LTP if his reelection prospects are not connected with
the result of the policy he has undertaken in the past. In the following section we propose a
mechanism that is helpful in solving the inefficiencies identified.
4 Solution by incentive contracts
In this section we extend the original game by giving the politicians the opportunity to offer
incentive contracts before the first election takes place. This means adding the following
additional stage:
Stage 0: At the beginning of period 1, both politicians simultaneously offer incentive con-
tracts C1(β1V 2) and C2(β2V 2) (with 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1) to the voters. These incentive
contracts have the following consequences: In the case of reelection in period 2,
politician i receives a net transfer βi V 2 if V 2 ≥ 0, while a negative value of V 2 has
no consequences, i.e. the politician receives neither a transfer nor has to pay any
penalties.
The other stages of the game are not modified. We assume that the three utility components
α max{0; V 2}, β max{0; V 2}, and B are not combined by their weighting factors.18 To keep
the analysis simple, we assume that the parameter for utility from monetary rewards due
to the incentive contract is 1.19 We only compare the impact of utility from projects to the
benefits from holding office. This seems to be an appropriate procedure if we assume that a
populist will mainly receive benefits from B, and that the monetary rewards of the incentive
contract are less important to him.20 Under these assumptions we obtain the following utility
function:
Ui (β, qi ) = pi {(1 − mi )B + mi αV 1 + δqi [(1 − mi )B + (miα + β) · max{0, V 2}]} (7)
18 Alternatively, one might assume that the utility component β max{0; V 2} is either weighted by m or by
1 − m. This would not damage the positive effect of incentive contracts but would only make the results less
clear with respect to the welfare comparison of policy success-seekers versus populists.
19 Another fixed weight for utility from monetary rewards by the incentive contract is possible and only
changes the results of ¯βC , ¯βNC , and ¯βNC Pa in Equations (8), (11) and (16), while the algebraic sign of the
derivations (10) and (14) remains unchanged.
20 This will be the case if the populist politician obtains utility mostly from the non-monetary benefit compo-
nents of B, like prestige or the satisfaction of being in power.
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We derive the results in the cases of commitment and non-commitment and denote the
equilibrium values for β by ¯βC and ¯βNC , respectively. At the end of this section, we will
have a short look at some possible extensions of the model in the scenario with incentive
contracts.
4.1 Competition in the case of voters’ commitment
We assume in this subsection that voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme at
the beginning of stage 0 (i.e. before the politicians offer their incentive contracts). It is then
possible to compare the scenario both with competition for incentive contracts and elections
to the scenario in the previous section with elections only. We obtain:
Proposition 3. Suppose that voters can commit themselves to a reelection scheme in stage
0, that incentive contracts can be offered by the politicians, and that m1 > m2 ≥ m˜ =
δB
αV 1S +δB−δαV 2L
. Then there will exist a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
{
C1(β1V 2), C2(β2V 2), p1 = 0, p2 = 1, q1(0) = 1, q2(0) = 1, q1
(
V 1S
) = 0, q2
(
V 1S
) = 0}
with
β1 = β2 = ¯βC =
m1αV 1S − δ
{(1 − m1)B + m1αV 2L
}
δV 2L
(8)
and with candidate 2 being elected and implementing LTP
if
δ · ¯βC V 2L < TV L − TV S . (9)
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the combination of elections and incentive contracts prevents
inefficient decision-making in politics by providing the possibility of future transfers to the
elected politician. Both politicians offer the same incentive contract. The equilibrium contract
is designed in such a way that the politician with the higher value of mi is indifferent about
choosing the long-term project or the short-term project. The politician with the lower value
of mi is elected according to our first tie-breaking rule.21 He will undertake the socially
efficient long-term project and will be reelected with certainty.
Note that, in the case of elections only, LTP would never be implemented because of
the assumption m1 > m2 ≥ m˜. In the next step, we examine what happens to the incentive
contracts in the case mi < m˜. For mi < m˜ we would have ¯βC < 0, because politicians with
such a low mi receive so much benefit from holding office that they would even pay money
to have LTP implemented in order to get elected. The extreme case mi = 0 would result
in ¯βC = − BV 2L . But by assumption we have the restriction 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, so we obtain a lower
21 Note that without our first tie-breaking rule both politicians would have election probabilities of 12 since the
public expects them to generate the same social welfare. In this case politician 2 would deviate to ¯βC − ε in
order to re-obtain an election probability of 1. We use the first tie-breaking rule to avoid these ε-considerations,
but the results of the paper would still be valid if we dropped this tie-breaking rule.
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limit m˜ = δB
αV 1S +δB−δαV 2L
> 0 for mi .22 This means that, when using incentive contracts, the
permitted values for mi are restricted by the following term:
0 <
δB
αV 1S + δB − δαV 2L
≤ mi ≤ 1.
In the following, we analyze how the amount of money transferred by the incentive contract
depends on the value of m1. From Equation (8) we obtain
∂ ¯βC
∂m1
= α
(
V 1S − δV 2L
) + δB
δV 2L
> 0. (10)
¯βC depends positively on m1.23 Therefore, a small m1 affects the elected politician 2 and
decreases the cost of transfers to him. It will be advantageous for the voters if both politicians
tend to be populistic.
4.2 Competition without commitment
Up to now we have analyzed how incentive contracts work when voters can commit them-
selves to a reelection scheme. Even though this gives the election mechanism the greatest
possible power to motivate politicians to undertake LTP, the commitment assumption is con-
trary to a fundamental democratic principle. The assumption that the public commits future
citizens to adhere to a particular voting behavior violates the principle of free and anonymous
elections in liberal democracies. A second argument against the commitment assumption is
that voters may have incentives not to reelect the incumbent in order to save the remuneration
due to his incentive contract.
We first deal with the democratic requirement for unconstrained voting. Assume the
extreme case in which there is complete uncertainty about the voting behavior of future
generations. Then the elected politician has an a priori expected reelection probability of
qi = 12 , independently of the policies he pursues.24 For this extreme non-commitment case
we obtain:
Proposition 4. Suppose m1 > m2 ≥ m˜. Then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium
{
C1(β1V 2), C2(β2V 2), p1 = 0, p2 = 1, q1(0) = 12 , q2(0) =
1
2
, q1
(
V 1S
) = 1
2
, q2
(
V 1S
) = 1
2
}
22 Note that this restriction is unproblematic, as for values mi < m˜ the implementation of the socially optimal
policy is assured anyway.
23 The intuition is as follows: ¯βC is calculated such that candidate 1 is indifferent about undertaking STP or
LTP. With growing m1, STP gets relatively more attractive as the weight of V 1S gets larger in comparison
to δB. Thus, the amount of money necessary to make the politician indifferent increases, which results in a
higher value ¯βC .
24 Note that this is the opposite of the commitment case, where the politicians knew their reelection probabilities
depending on their policy results. These two extreme cases act as benchmarks. In reality, intermediate cases
are much more plausible.
Springer
284 Public Choice (2007) 132:273–289
with
β1 = β2 = ¯βNC =
m1α
(
2V 1S − δV 2L
)
δV 2L
(11)
and with candidate 2 being elected and implementing LTP
if
δ ¯βNC V 2L < TV L − TV S . (12)
Proof: The proof is analogous to the commitment case. Here we have to compare
U L1 ( ¯βNC , q1 = 12 ) with U S1 ( ¯βNC , q1 = 12 ). This yields the following condition:
¯βNC ≥ 2m1αV
1
S − δm1αV 2L
δV 2L
and we achieve Equation (11). 
As
m1α
(
2V 1S − δV 2L
)
δV 2L
>
m1αV 1S − m1αδV 2L
δV 2L
≥ m1αV
1
S − δ
{(1 − m1)B + m1αV 2L
}
δV 2L
,
we obtain the following corollary as an immediate consequence:
Corollary 3.
¯βNC > ¯βC (13)
In the non-commitment case, it requires higher remuneration to make the politician with
the higher factor m1 indifferent as to LTP and STP. The uncertainty of reelection in the case
of having adopted LTP must be compensated by higher remuneration.
In the non-commitment case, the amount of money transferred by the incentive contract
again depends positively on the value of m1, as we see from Equation (11):
∂ ¯βNC
∂m1
= α
(
2V 1S − δV 2L
)
δV 2L
> 0. (14)
Therefore in the non-commitment case too, it will be advantageous for the voters if both
politicians tend to be populistic.
Now we analyze the other kind of non-commitment. It is possible that voters may not
reelect the incumbent in order to save the remuneration due to his incentive contract. This
problem can be solved by golden parachute contracts, which are denoted by C Pa and work
as follows: The incentive contract will not only inure if the incumbent is reelected but also
if he stands for reelection and is not reelected. Therefore, the incumbent will profit from the
positive value of V 2L even if he is no longer in office. Golden parachute contracts decrease
the pecuniary interests of the public in not reelecting the incumbent. Hence, they strengthen
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the motivation of politicians to undertake LTP. U Pa,Li (βi , qi = 0) denotes the utility of a
politician who has offered a golden parachute contract, implements LTP, and is not reelected.
This utility is given by
U Pa,Li (βi , qi = 0) = pi
((1 − mi )B + miαV 1L + δβi V 2L
)
. (15)
We denote the critical value forβ in the non-commitment case with golden parachute contracts
by ¯βNC Pa and obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose that m1 > m2 ≥ m˜. We assume that politicians can offer golden
parachute contracts and that the incumbent is never reelected. There exists a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium where politicians offer golden parachute contracts
{
C Pa1 (β1V 2), C Pa2 (β2V 2), p1 = 0, p2 = 1, q1(0) = 0, q2(0) = 0, q1
(
V 1S
) = 0, q2
(
V 1S
) = 0}
with
β1 = β2 = ¯βNC Pa = m1αV
1
S
δV 2L
(16)
and with candidate 2 being elected, implementing LTP, and not getting reelected
if
δ · ¯βNC Pa V 2L < TV L − TV S . (17)
The proof is similar to the commitment case. The value ¯βNC Pa is determined by set-
ting U Pa,L1 ( ¯βNC Pa, q1 = 0) = U S1 ( ¯βNC Pa, q1 = 0). We use the tie-breaking rule that the
candidate with the lower factor mi will be elected if the public is indifferent between the two
politicians. We have assumed an extreme case of non-commitment in proposition 5, but the
option of offering golden parachute contracts also works for intermediate values of positive
reelection probabilities.
The comparison of ¯βC and ¯βNC Pa yields the following corollary:
Corollary 4.
¯βNC Pa > ¯βC (18)
An immediate consequence is that golden parachute contracts are not able to guarantee
the implementation of LTP at such low costs for the public as in the commitment case.
This is obvious, as larger monetary incentives are necessary to compensate for the fact that
undertaking LTP does no longer result in higher reelection chances. Finally, we compare
¯βNC and ¯βNC Pa . Since ¯βNC can be written as ¯βNC Pa + m1αV 1S −δm1αV 2L
δV 2L
, we get the following
corollary:
Corollary 5.
¯βNC Pa < ¯βNC (19)
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Thus for the voters, golden parachute contracts are cheaper than ordinary incentive contracts
in the non-commitment case. This is due to the fact that politicians always receive the
payments from the incentive contract in the golden parachute case, while the probability
of receiving the incentive contract payments is only 12 in the non-commitment case. This
positive effect in the golden parachute case is larger than the negative effect of not having
the utility 12δαm1V
2
L which the politician receives from the project in the non-commitment
case.
4.3 Extensions
In this subsection, we will briefly address two extensions of our basic model. First, we will
analyze a situation with asymmetric information. Then, we will examine the case where
incentive contracts may also include punishment for poor performance.
We have assumed that the public knows the politicians’ values of mi . But this seems to
be rather unlikely in certain circumstances, e.g. when politicians run for office for the first
time. Suppose that voters are uncertain regarding mi . They presume that a politician has
m = m˜ (0 < m˜ < 1) with probability z and m = 1 with probability 1 − z. Suppose that both
politicians are fully informed about the value m of their opponent, which seems to be realistic
because political opponents usually know each other well. As shown in the extended version
(Mu¨ller, 2006), there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game when the public
can commit to a reelection scheme. As in the basic model, politicians can be motivated to
undertake LTP. However, the incentive contract must stipulate larger transfers.
Another useful extension is to allow for monetary punishments of politicians who choose
STP and who are reelected. Then, it may be optimal for voters to reelect a politician who
selects STP in order to punish him. As shown in Mu¨ller (2006), such schemes may lower
the costs of motivating the politician to undertake LTP, if the monetary punishment can be
enforced.
5 Statesmen versus populists
In our model, the politician is only concerned about the social returns of his policy as long
as he is in office and as long as they are positive. One could also assume that a politician has
private welfare losses when the project he implements generates lower social returns than the
status quo, and that his utility will also be influenced by the project results if they occur when
he is no longer in office. We will call a politician a “statesman” if he has a high value mi , if
he has private welfare losses from negative project results, and if his utility is also influenced
by project results if they occur when he is no longer in office.
In this section, we are interested in the comparison between statesmen and populists. We
look at the simplest case, assuming that no incentive contracts can be offered and that voters
can commit to a reelection scheme, namely q(0) = 1 and q(V 1S ) = 0. As we already know
from Corollary 2, a 100% populist (this means mi = 0) will always undertake LTP.25 We now
assume that mi = 1 to analyze the behavior of 100% statesmen given the reelection scheme
of the voters. If the politician undertakes LTP, then the voters will reelect him, whereas he
will be deselected after undertaking STP. Therefore, we need to compare U Li (qi = 1) with
25 Note that the behavior of a 100% populist is not affected by the changes in the utility function. If he
undertakes LTP he will have utility B + δB, whereas he will have utility B if he undertakes STP.
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U Si (qi = 0) and obtain the following results:
U Li (qi = 1) = δαV 2L > 0 (20)
and
U Si (qi = 0) = αV 1S + δαV 2S < 0. (21)
Thus, a 100% statesman will always choose LTP.
We can summarize our results as follows. In our model frame a 100% populist will always
behave in a socially optimal manner, while the behavior of a 100% statesman depends
on assumptions concerning private welfare from project results. It is not implausible for a
politician who is extremely statesman-like to have private welfare losses in the case of a
negative project result and for these losses to occur even when he is no longer in office.
Therefore, it is no longer possible to make a definite statement about the welfare effects of
statesmen versus populists in the scenario without incentive contracts.
As 100% populists and statesmen with private welfare losses in the case of negative project
results already act in a socially optimal manner when there are elections only, there is no need
for incentive contracts under these assumptions. Thus, we can sum up as follows: In our basic
model, incentive contracts improve social welfare and populists are more easily motivated
to implement the socially optimal project than policy success-seekers. While it is possible to
create situations where incentive contracts are not needed any more, incentive contracts for
politicians always have at least a non-negative effect.26 The question whether populists are
generally more beneficial for society seems to be more complicated. Although the finding
that populists are desirable for a society is not robust under all possible modifications, we
have at least shown that it is possible for a society to be justified in preferring populists to
statesmen. Detailed analysis of this issue is a matter for future research.
6 Conclusion and perspectives
In our simple model we obtain the surprising result that populists are better for social welfare
than “policy success-seekers”. However, the more interesting comparison between statesmen
and populists might differ from this result in a more realistic framework since this result is
at least partially caused by the chosen form of the utility function. Nevertheless, we have at
least shown that it might be better for society if a politician is a populist. Furthermore, we
have shown that incentive contracts enabling the implementation of socially optimal policy
will be cheaper for society if politicians tend to be populistic.
Looking at optimal design of political constitutions, we find that there are some other
interesting issues. One might for example discuss the optimal setting of wages for politicians.
Will an increase of remuneration have positive effects? On the one hand, higher wages might
motivate the incumbent to initiate better policy projects since he has larger incentives to
behave in a socially optimal manner in order to get reelected. On the other hand, higher
wages might reduce the quality of the pool of candidates. Low wages might mean that most
candidates have intrinsic motivations. They are really interested in the results of their policy
and think that political activity is their civic duty. With growing remuneration there might
26 Note that we disregard the administrative and wage costs of the incentive contracts here.
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be more and more candidates aiming for political careers for monetary reasons.27 Another
interesting topic is the effect of term limits. If the socially optimal policy diverges from
the opinion of the median voter, then politicians who are mainly interested in benefits from
holding office will not implement the socially efficient policy, since they will have no chance
of getting reelected in this case. In a scenario with term limits, the incumbent might undertake
the socially optimal policy during his final term of office. On the other hand, the control effect
of the reelection mechanism is normally advantageous for society. A formal discussion of
these related topics and their influence on the efficiency of incentive contracts is a matter for
future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that condition (9) is necessary for the equilibrium to
be rational from the voters’ point of view. As long as condition (9) is fulfilled, the welfare
advantage of LTP compared to STP (i.e. TV L − TV S) is larger than the costs that accrue to the
public from the incentive contract (i.e. δ ¯βC V 2L ) for a given value of ¯βC . Hence, condition (9)
ensures that the voters are better off by committing themselves to reelect a politician who has
implemented LTP than by choosing the reelection scheme q1(0) = q2(0) = 0, which avoids
the transfer ¯βC V 2L but leads to STP.
In the next step we calculate the value ¯βC . As m1 > m2, we determine ¯βC in such a way
that the first candidate will be indifferent as to choosing STP or LTP, if he gets elected. We use
the reelection scheme q(0) = 1 and q(V 1S ) = 0 for the public, which is the largest possible
spread to punish politicians for undertaking STP. Thus, ¯βC is determined by setting
U L1 ( ¯βC , q1 = 1) = U S1 (q1 = 0), (A.1)
which gives Equation (8). In the next step we look at candidate 2. To predict the behavior
of candidate 2 if he offers ¯βC we have to compare U L2 ( ¯βC , q2 = 1) and U S2 (q2 = 0). For
U L2 ( ¯βC , q2 = 1) > U S2 (q2 = 0) to be true, it must hold that:
(1 − m2)δB + m2δαV 2L + δV 2L
m1αV 1S − δ
{(1 − m1)B + m1αV 2L
}
δV 2L
> m2αV 1S (A.2)
This expression can be simplified to (m1 − m2)(δB + αV 1S − δαV 2L ) > 0, which holds since
m2 < m1. Therefore, we have U L2 ( ¯βC , q2 = 1) > U S2 (q2 = 0). Thus, candidate 2 will offer
¯βC , and he is elected according to the first tie-breaking rule.
To establish the equilibrium, we consider four possible deviations from the equilibrium
described in Proposition 3.
First, suppose that candidate 2 deviates and offers C2(β2V 2) with β2 > ¯βC . The deviation
is not profitable, as candidate 2 is not elected in this case because candidate 1 also implements
LTP and demands a lower transfer.
Second, suppose candidate 1 deviates to C1(β1V 2) with β1 > ¯βC . Then the public will
not elect politician 1 even if he were to undertake LTP, because it is cheaper for the voters
to elect the second candidate. Therefore, the deviation is not profitable.
27 However, as we showed above, it is not totally clear whether politicians who are mainly interested in the
benefits from holding office are really worse for society than intrinsically motivated politicians.
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Third, suppose candidate 1 deviates to C1(β1V 2) with β1 < ¯βC . This would imply
U L1 (β1, q1 = 1) < U S1 (q1 = 0). Thus, candidate 1 would implement STP. The public will
not elect candidate 1, therefore the deviation is not profitable.
Finally, it is obvious that the second candidate has no incentive to offer a contract C2(β2V 2)
with β2 < ¯βC because he would receive lower transfers in the second period and β2 < ¯βC
does not increase his chances of being elected.
Uniqueness follows in a similar way. For any offer constellation C1(β1V 2), C2(β2V 2)
with βi = ¯βC for at least one candidate, one of the politicians has an incentive to deviate by
offering Ci ( ¯βC V 2) or by offering an incentive contract that requires slightly lower transfers
from the public.28
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